Abstract-The distributed storage systems (DSS) are constructed by large number of nodes which are interconnected over a network. Each node in the network is vulnerable and a potential risk of attack. The attackers can eavesdrop the nodes and possibly modify their data. Despite the considerable efforts, both in industry and in academia, high reliability and security remain major challenges in running large scale distributed systems. Therefore, we design a secure Twin code framework for a distributed storage network that simplifies both data reconstruction and efficient node repair. We examine it in an eavesdropper model, where the passive attackers can access to the stored data or/and downloaded data during the node repair and prove that the new Twin code gives better results than the MBR and MSR codes, regarding the security in the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage is often implemented by complex multi-tiered distributed systems on clusters of thousands of commodity servers. These systems known as distributed storage systems (DSS) store different types of data-files (messages) dispersed across the distributed servers (nodes) in the network. DSS are commonplace nowadays, they operate in several environments such as peer-to-peer (P2P) systems and data centers that comprise the backbone infrastructure of cloud computing. Main advantage offered by the DSS is reliable and costeffective storage of large amounts of data. As the number of its components increases (storage nodes, routers, network, power supply, cooling, etc.), a DSS ends up having a significant subset of these components not functioning properly at almost any time instance. Thus, a fault tolerance is essential to make the overall system and its services transparent from the underlying faults. This is achieved by addition of redundancy.
Redundancy is accomplished in many different manners. The most simplest and common form applied in these systems is by using three-times data replication schemes. The more redundancy is used, the more fault-tolerant the DSS becomes. But the redundancy increases the overheads of the storage infrastructure.
A smarter solution with less redundancy and better reliability is offered by Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) erasure codes. Not surprisingly, major industry players like Google and Microsoft have adopted the use of erasure codes in the new Google File System and Windows Azure, respectively. Other storage services like CleverSafe and Wuala have been using erasure codes in their systems for longer.
For understanding the erasure codes concept, the size of the date file that needs to be stored in the distributed network is denoted by given in symbols (bits or digits). The file is divided into pieces, mapped to encoded fragments using an ( , ) MDS erasure code, and all encoded pieces are stored on distinct nodes in the network. When the user wants to retrieve the data the system access the encoded fragments stored on any of these nodes, and carrying out a reconstruction (decoding). If a node fails, = symbols are affected. In order the system being fault tolerant a repair process of the lost data should be performed on a new replacement node called newcomer. In this process the newcomer contacts at least active nodes, downloads the entire data stored on them and after that executes adequate operations for extracting the exact lost data stored on the failed node.
This strategy is a waste of communication bandwidth if only one encoded fragment is needed, though its cost is depreciated if repairs are delayed, and multiple repairs are carried out together. Therefore, a new concept of codes called regenerating codes is introduced in [1] ,which can be seen as a combination of an erasure and a network codes.
In the regenerating codes ( ≥ ) nodes out of − 1 are contacted during the repair process and data of size ( ≤ ) is downloaded from each of the nodes. The correlation between the total downloaded amount = , known as repair bandwidth and the storage is studied in [2] - [5] . Based on their tradeoff, in [1] two extreme points are obtained, Minimum Storage Regeneration (MSR) and Minimum Bandwidth Regeneration (MBR). Both extremes cannot be satisfied at the same time, so Rashmi et al. in [6] proposed a new concept for distributed storage network, Twin-code framework that eases the data reconstruction and the node repair during failure of some nodes in the network.
DSS design includes a great number of nodes widely spread across the Internet which may carry sensitive information, and each node is vulnerable and a potential point of attack. The attackers can eavesdrop the nodes and possibly modify their data. Hence, DSS should be secure apart from satisfying the reconstruction and repair requirements. Some researches that cover the topic of security are formulated in [7] - [9] . This paper, besides the reliability of the distributed stored data, addresses the issue of its security. In our analysis we compare the performances of the new proposed Twin code and the storage systems using MBR and MRS codes, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: In section II we discuss the design of the Twin-code framework. In Section III we prove that the maximum message size which is distributed in the Twin MDS code storage system is greater than the upper bound of the message size distributed in DSS by MBR codes and equal with the upper bound of the message size distributed in DSS by MSR codes. In Section IV we configure a new secure Twin-code framework in presence of passive adversary and show that our proposed secure scheme gives better secrecy performance than both MBR and MSR codes. Section V concludes the paper.
II. TWIN-CODE FRAMEWORK
In the Twin-code framework all nodes are partitioned into two groups: nodes of Type 1 and nodes of Type 2. Note that the storage nodes of both types have the same characteristics. The data stored on Type 1 nodes is encoded using a linear code 1 ; and the data on Type 2 nodes, first the message symbols are permuted by transposition and then encoded by a second linear code 2 . It is not necessary the two codes to be distinct.
In the case of data reconstruction, the data collector contacts a feasible subset of nodes of a same type for recovering the entire message as is shown in Fig 1(a) . When a node of certain type fails, the repair process is accomplished by downloading data from a feasible subset of nodes from the opposite type, depicted in Fig. 1(b) . The number of the minimal size of the feasible subset of nodes in the reconstruction or the repair process depends on the nature of the Twin-codes. Without loss of generality, the nodes in any DSS can be divided into systematic and parity nodes. A node is called systematic node if the symbols which are stored on it are original, and if the symbols are some combination of the original symbols, then the node is called parity node. In this paper, we assume repair process of systematic nodes.
A. Encoding
Using the Twin-code framework in [6] there are 1 Type 1 nodes, and 2 Type 2, where = 1 + 2 is the total number of storage nodes in the network.
In the sequel we use the following notations:
1) The size of the original message is TW symbols, which belongs to a finite field ; 2) , = 1, 2 is an ( , ) linear code over with generator matrix ; 3) g ( , ) for all 1 ≤ ≤ is the -th column of , = 1, 2.
The original message is first split into fragments of symbols, such that, TW = 2 . Hence, these symbols are arranged into a square ( × ) matrix 1 , called a message matrix. Let 2 ≜ 1 , where the superscript T denotes a transpose of a matrix. For = 1, 2 each node of Type stores symbols from the appropriate column of the ( × ) matrix , i.e., in the node (1 ≤ ≤ ) of Type we store the symbols from the -th column of the matrix , = 1, 2 defined by g ( , ) . So, every node stores symbols and each node of Type is associated with a different column g ( , ) of , called encoding vector of that node. With this algorithm the data is encoded and mapped into the network.
B. Twin MDS Codes for data -reconstruction and node repair
For the case where the linear codes 1 and 2 are MDS codes over , the data collector can perform the reconstruction process of the entire message only by contacting any nodes. All connected nodes must be of same type. The amount of stored data that will be downloaded during this process is 2 = TW . In general, it is important to note that the connectivity in such Twin-framework system must be at least 2 − 1 for satisfactory availability and higher guarantees.
In a case of a failed node, the newcomer from certain type must contact any nodes belonging to the opposite type. To recover the lost data just a single symbol from each node will be downloaded, that is = 1. For a successful repair process, in any moment, nodes of Type 1 and nodes of the Type 2 must be alive.
For example, if we assume that node m from Type 1 fails, the newcomer (replacement node) must recover the following k symbols 1 g (1, ) . Therefore, the newcomer contacts k helper nodes of Type 2. The -th helper node (1 ≤ ≤ 2 ) for all , 1 ≤ ≤ , sends the product of the encoding vector g (1, ) with the k symbols of the helper node 2 g (2, ) , i.e., g (1, ) 2 g (2, ) . So, the replacement node obtains access to the k symbols g ( 
. Defining ≜ g (1, ) Therefore, the symbols that have to be recovered at the newcomer are the symbols contained into the vector
Thus, the repair process of a Type 1 node is brought to the erasure decoding of the code 2 .
Example 1: We illustrate thedistribution of information in Twin-code framework with the following example. Let distribute the message of TW = 16 symbols arranged in message matrix 1 in the network with 1 = 5 nodes of Type 1 and 2 = 6 nodes of Type 2 using the generator matrices 1 and 2 as shown in Fig. 2 . The data collector can reconstruct the information by contacting any = 4 nodes of the same type,or repair the lost data of a failed node by contacting again = 4 nodes of the opposite type.
For more detailed information about Twin-code and its advantages in data reconstruction and repair process, refer [6] .
III. SYSTEM EFFICIENCY IN TWIN MDS FRAMEWORK
The efficiency of the DSS is measured in number of message symbols that can be distributed in the system. Therefore, in this section we compare the upper bounds of the number of message symbols which are distributed in DSS by MBR and MSR codes with the maximum number of message symbols distributed within Twin MDS code framework.
In [1] , authors establish that the general achievable bound of the regenerating codes is
Based on the tradeoff between the repair bandwidth and storage per node, two coding strategies are proposed. MBR codes achieve minimal possible repair bandwidth = , i.e., the node downloads only what it stores. Plugging = in (1), replacing the inequality with equality, an MBR code, with no secrecy requirements, must satisfy
Since in the Twin MDS code framework the repair bandwidth is = 1, we compare it with MBR codes with the same bandwidth. MBR codes with = 1 have data storage = and are constructed such that the message matrix is populated by message symbols
MSR codes achieve minimum possible storage at each node.
The message size is , so each node stores = data. Based on that statement, from (1) and replacing the inequality with equality when there is no secrecy requirement, MSR codes must satisfy
In the Twin MDS code framework, by definition, the size of the message that can be distributed in the system is maximum TW = 2 . Since in such framework = 1 and = = , we can compare it with MBR codes by using the same parameters. Plugging = 1, = = in (3), the size of the distributed file with MBR codes becomes
Knowing that TW = 2 ≥ = ( + 1) 2 , we conclude that the number of message symbols that can be distributed in the Twin MDS code storage system is greater or equal to the number of message symbols distributed by MBR codes in the special case when = 1 and = = .
In the Twin MDS codes the connectivity must be at least = 2 −1, so, for the comparison of the file size distributed in Twin MDS code and the file size in the DSS with MSR codes we plugging = 2 − 1 and = 1 in (4). Therefore, the node storage should be = and the size of the distributed file with MSR codes is = 2 . This indicates that the number of message symbols that can be distributed in the Twin MDS code storage system is the same as the number of message symbols distributed by MSR codes when = 1 and = 2 − 1. Fig.3 shows the difference of the size of the message symbols stored in the Twin MDS code framework and in DSS with MBR codes if = 1, = = and MSR codes if = 1, = 2 − 1, when the message is divided in = 3, ..., 50 pieces.
IV. SECRECY IN DSS
The security in DSS is measured in number of message symbols that can be securely distributed in the system. Therefore, in this section we consider the upper bounds of the achievable secure file size that can be distributed in a network by MBR and MSR codes in presence of passive adversary. Next in the following subsections respectively, we construct a new secure Twin MDS code framework and calculate the number of message symbols that can be securely stored in it. In addition, we prove that the achievable secure file size stored in a network by MBR and MSR codes is less than the stored secure file size in this new Twin MDS code framework.
Let ( 1 , 2 ) is eavesdropper model, = 1 + 2 < , defined in [8] where an eavesdropper may gain access to: either the data stored in a subset of 1 storage nodes, or to the data downloaded during the repair process of other 2 nodes, or both. This concept is a generalized version from the eavesdropper model considered by Pawar et al. in [7] and [10] . The achievability of security in an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper model is formalized by the following definition:
Definition 1 (Security in an ( 1 , 2 ) Eavesdropper [8] ): Consider a DSS in which an eavesdropper gains access to the data stored on some 1 nodes, and the data downloaded during repair on some other 2 nodes. An ( 1 , 2 ) secure distributed storage system with secure file size ( ) is such, where an eavesdropper obtains no information about the message, i.e.
( ; e) = 0, where is the secure information of size ( ) , and e represents the eavesdropper's observation.
In [7] , Pawar et al. provide an upper bound of the number of message symbols ( ) that can securely be stored in the system in presence of eavesdroppers
This bound can be interpreted as: The first out of nodes to which a data collector connects are compromised. Thus, assuming that the secrecy goals are met, these nodes will provide zero information about the message symbols, and only the remaining − nodes in the summation in (1) will contain useful information. At MBR point = , so the replacement node downloads only the original stored data, and the eavesdropper cannot obtain any extra downloaded information from the repair process. Thus, without loss of generality it may be assumed that 2 = 0. Plugging = in the equation (6) and replacing the inequality with equality, the secure file size of MBR is
For MSR codes, the eavesdropper has an access to 1 nodes, and listens 2 nodes from the reparation process. In [9] Goparaju et al. have established an upper bound of the achievable secure file size in presence of both types of attack,
Hence, can see a challenge in obtaining a secure coding schemes that would give better rate and/or secrecy capacity than these proposed in [8] and [9] .
A. Secure Twin MDS code framework
Our solution to this challenge is designing a new secure coding scheme against an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper. The constructions is based on Twin MDS codes such that the message matrix first is modified with TW − ( ) TW random symbols, where ( ) TW is the achievable secure file size. First, we state the following property in such framework.
Lemma 1: 1) Let a passive eavesdropper gains access to the stored data on = 1 nodes in a Twin MDS code framework. (ii) Then only independent symbols could be compromised.
2) Let a passive eavesdropper has an access to the stored data on any 1 nodes and observes the downloaded data from 2 nodes in a repare process in a Twin MDS code framework. Then only ( 1 + 2 ) independent symbols could be observed by the ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper. The proof is given in [11] . Now, we define the achievability scheme. There are 1 Type 1 nodes, and 2 Type 2 nodes, where = 1 + 2 is the total number of storage nodes in the framework. The storage nodes of both types have the same characteristics.
Let f s is secure information of size
at MBR and MSR points, respectively, i.e., f
) at MBR and MSR points, respectively; distributed uniformly at random over , and append r to obtain f = (r, f s ) ∈ , that will be encoded in the following manner:
...
... ...
• Use the encoding algorithm defined in Section II. A. Finally the data is encoded by the above algorithm and mapped into the network. The security for this coding scheme from Minimum Bandwidth Regenerating (MBR) point and Minimum Storage Regenerating (MSR) point is stated as:
1) The code based on Twin MDS code that is modifying the message matrix with random symbols, explained as above, achieves a secure file size ( − ) in an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper model, where 2 = 0 and = 1 < at MBR point with = and = 1.
2) The code based on Twin MDS code that is modifying the message matrix with ( 1 + 2 ) random symbols, explained as above, at MSR point with = 1 and = 2 − 1 achieves a secure file size ( − 1 − 2 ) in an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper model, where 1 + 2 < and 2 nodes are compromised. The proof is given in [11] .
In Fig. 4 is shown the security achievement of the Twin MDS code framework with 1 = 5 nodes of Type 1 and 2 = 6 nodes of Type 2, where TW = 16 and the generator matrices over 11 are, Now, we compare the achievable file size in the Twin MDS code framework and in the storage system with MBR and MSR codes in presence of passive eavesdroppers. From Theorem 1 we provide the following two corollaries Corollary 2: The Twin MDS code framework gives better secrecy performance than MBR codes for = 1 and = = in presence of = 1 eavesdroppers, ( < ). Plugging = 1 and = = in (7), the size of the secure message symbols achieved by the MBR codes is 
This means that the number of message symbols that can be securely stored in the Twin-code framework is greater or equal than the number of the secure message symbols stored in a system using MBR codes. In the Twin MDS codes the connectivity must be at least = 2 − 1, so for the comparison of the secure filze size distributed in Twin MDS and in the DSS with MSR codes we plugging = 2 − 1 in (8), so the secure size file becomes
Corollary 3: The Twin MDS code framework gives better secrecy performance than the MSR codes in a distributed storage system, when = 1, = 2 − 1 and = 1 + 2 ( < ) nodes are compromised. The node storage capacity in a DSS that uses MSR codes with = 2 − 1 is = . Hence, plugging = in (9) the achievable secure file size in presence of both types of attacks is
, which implies that ( ) TW > ( ) . This means that the secure file stored in the Twin MDS code framework is larger in size than the secure file stored in a distributed storage system that uses MSR codes in presence of eavesdroppers of both types.
In Fig. 5 we compare the size of the secure message between the Twin MDS framework (squares or dots) and the DSS with MBR codes (circles) and MSR codes (triangles), respectively, when the message is divided into = 50 pieces. Although the number of secure message symbols decreases in all cases, as the number of eavesdroppers that gain access to the stored data is increasing from 1 to 49 in MBR code, or as the number of eavesdroppers that gain access to the data downloaded during repair of some failed nodes is increasing from 1 to 47 and have read access in two storage nodes in MSR code, the secure file size is larger for the Twin MDS code framework.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we obtained reliable cloud storage system with more efficient distribution and greater security than systems constructed with regenerating codes at MBR and MSR points. We obtained the achievable file size in a new secure distributed storage system with and without secrecy constraints and compared it by the achievable file size in the DSS with MBR and MSR codes. The conclusion is that our code gives better result than the MBR and equal with the MSR codes in the distribution process, and moreover better security performance from both MBR and MSR coding schemes.
